This will likely be a multi-part post, because I'm still working on framing the issue in my head. But I've been thinking for a while about how being good at or doing well on inspections really translates into being successful at the mission or effective at our jobs. DILIGENCE entered her "inspection cycle" earlier this fiscal year and has gone through about half of our required inspections so far. We still have our big ones, Command Assessment of Readiness for Training (CART) and Tailored Ships Training Availability (TSTA, pronounced tis-ta) coming up in the next number of months. We've had Finance & Admin, Ordnance Technical Inspection (OTI, pronounced oh-tee-eye) and Ordnance Safety Inspection (OSI, pronounced oh-ess-eye -- no idea why these are not oh-tee and oh-see), Food Service Assistance and Training Team (FSAT, pronounced ef-sat), and Aviation Standardization (AVSTAN). We've spent countless hours reviewing checklists at many different levels, double checking them, building binders of documentation, running reports, and on and on and on. And, truly, I do understand the need for all the bureaucracy when it comes to safety, money, bullets, people, training, accountability, etc, etc. There's a reason why we have all the regulations and requirements, and the checklists we use for the inspections are hugely helpful at making sure we're doing what we're supposed to be doing as told in numerous different places, spread through a couple hundred different manuals. I'm not questioning the inspection requirement or process. What I am wondering is, in an organization like the Coast Guard whose guiding principles are Service to Nation, Duty to People and Commitment to Excellence, how does a commitment to excellence in inspections translate into service to nation? Is there a direct link between operational excellence -- being good at what we do out on the water chasing narco-terrorist or rescuing people from overloaded and unsafe boats or searching out a mariner in distress -- really what the American people pay their taxes for us to do, and the sometimes mind-numbing tedium of being good administratively? Or are administrative organization and operational readiness two sides of the same coin? I feel a diagram coming on:
Hopefully, that worked. If for some reason the diagram didn't translate through all the computers, it's basically a two-dimensional graph, with "Mission Effectiveness" on the horizontal axis and "Administrative Effectiveness" on the vertical axis. There's a scale for both axes, from "Poor" to "Good." I think what I want my question to do is to fill in what scenarios look like for each of the quadrants. And is "Mission Effectiveness" a misnomer? How much of what we consider "Mission Effectiveness," i.e., drugs seized, suspected narco-traffickers arrested, lives saved, migrants interdicted, is just plain the luck of being in the right place at the right time (the power of an effective intelligence process not-with-standing)? And not being unlucky with mishaps because sometimes shit just goes squirrely (an unexpected visit from Mr Murphy that the best team coordination cannot avert)? I gotta stop now -- I think I'm getting to what's been bugging me, but I still have a couple of layers to peel through. LCDR Charlotte Mundy Executive Officer USCGC DILIGENCE (WMEC 616) ** UNDERWAY**

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